MULTIPLE DRAFTS: PERCEPTION WITHOUT REPRESENTATION - outline

I . ASSUMPTIONS

	i.	The materialist assumption
	ii.	First imagine a person
	iii.	The structure by means of which
	iv.	We forget what it is we're explaining
	v .	Gibson understood that the brain is the real eye
	vi .	Certain sorts of mental talk

II. DENNETT

	i.	There are three key assumptions
	ii.	Imagine it this ways Dennett says
	iii.	Our senses do not bring exhibits
	iv.	A judgment in Dennett isn't a sentence either
	v .	Dennett's second assumption
	vi .	Dennett explains sensory engagement
	vii.	A thinking state might be

III. MYTHS

	i.	What kind of body this mind is
	ii.	These images which pass off from things
	iii.	The instabilities of reference we feel
	iv.	Thus Hume's explanatory dynamics
	v .	Central terms such as 'a perception'

IV. REPRESENTATIONAL METAPHOR

	i.	A representation is a representing object
	ii.	Representation has no business in the brain
	iii.	There is a way to use 'representation' carefully
	iv.	Yolton makes the interesting suggestion
	v .	Akins says Dennett's question is
	vi .	How to talk about colour phi is evident
	vii.	Does this mean we can never think about a minute ago?

V. "CONSCIOUS AWARENESS AS PEOPLE REDUNDANTLY SAY"

	i.	We could say 'experience' is this flux
	ii.	To say Consciousness' is imaginary
	iii.	"Always get rid of the idea of a private object"
	iv.	Imagine a philosopher trying not to forget
	v .	When I say, what is memory like
	vi .	"The very 'feel' of our phenomenology"
	vii.	"Narrative stream:"