MULTIPLE DRAFTS: PERCEPTION WITHOUT REPRESENTATION - outline

I . ASSUMPTIONS

   i.  The materialist assumption
 ii.  First imagine a person
 iii.  The structure by means of which
   iv.  We forget what it is we're explaining
   v .  Gibson understood that the brain is the real eye
 vi .  Certain sorts of mental talk

II. DENNETT

   i.  There are three key assumptions
 ii.  Imagine it this ways Dennett says
 iii.  Our senses do not bring exhibits
   iv.  A judgment in Dennett isn't a sentence either
   v .  Dennett's second assumption
 vi .  Dennett explains sensory engagement
   vii.  A thinking state might be

III. MYTHS

   i.  What kind of body this mind is
 ii.  These images which pass off from things
 iii.  The instabilities of reference we feel
   iv.  Thus Hume's explanatory dynamics
   v .  Central terms such as 'a perception'

IV. REPRESENTATIONAL METAPHOR

   i.  A representation is a representing object
 ii.  Representation has no business in the brain
 iii.  There is a way to use 'representation' carefully
   iv.  Yolton makes the interesting suggestion
   v .  Akins says Dennett's question is
 vi .  How to talk about colour phi is evident
   vii.  Does this mean we can never think about a minute ago?

V. "CONSCIOUS AWARENESS AS PEOPLE REDUNDANTLY SAY"

   i.  We could say 'experience' is this flux
 ii.  To say Consciousness' is imaginary
 iii.  "Always get rid of the idea of a private object"
   iv.  Imagine a philosopher trying not to forget
   v .  When I say, what is memory like
 vi .  "The very 'feel' of our phenomenology"
   vii.  "Narrative stream:"